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 When discussing Forensic Ballistics it is important to understand what it is and 
what it isn’t. Today the term forensic ballistic does not mean the use of scientific 
knowledge or methods suitable to a court of law in solving crimes concerning the 
movement of objects (such as bullets or rockets) that are shot or forced to move forward 
through the air, it is about identifying a weapon to a bullet or shell casing from a crime 
scene to put the bad guy in prison.1,2 Due to the popularity of criminal investigation 
shows the average American could probably explain that forensic ballistic examiners link 
evidence such as shell casings or bullets using key features of shell casings and bullets to 
link specimens to a particular weapon and if necessary testify in court, however 
television’s portrayal of forensic ballistics contributes to a general misunderstanding of 
its limits. Calvin Goddard coined the use of the term Forensic Ballistics in 1925 in his 
paper using that title, however the paper discussed use of a comparison microscope to 
match shell casings and bullets to a specific gun.3  
 Prior a discussion on the current view courts take regarding the admissibility of 
Forensic Ballistic experts testimony concerning the identification of a particular weapon 
the following knowledge will provide the basics. 
 The field of forensic science recognizes four types of “ballistics”; Internal 
ballistics refers to the forces, pressure, and ignition that operate on the bullet while still 
inside the firearm; External ballistics, describes the flight of a bullet between the firearm 
muzzle and its impact at target; Terminal ballistics describe the mechanics of impact on 
                                                 
1 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ballistics (Last visited April 18, 2014) 
2 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/forensic (Last visited April 18, 2014) 
3 Section III contains a discussion about the first uses of the Forensic Ballistics to prove police officers 
where innocent of a murder.  
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both the projectile and the target; and Forensic ballistics which is the analysis of bullet 
and cartridge case evidence and the use of that evidence to link specimens to each other 
and to particular weapons.4 While this paper will attempt to use the term Forensic 
Ballistics exclusively at times the term ballistics will be used for short hand. In the world 
of forensic science a “toolmark” refers to any mark left on an object by coming into 
contact with another, typically harder, object.5 Expert criminal laboratory technicians 
examine shell casings and bullets to match identifying marks to a particular weapon 
under the assumption that guns leave individually indefinable marks and if necessary will 
testify to in court. 
 The technique of firearm identification involves the expert examining the marks 
created on a bullet or shell casings (projectiles). The bullet and shell casing come from 
the cartridge, which is made up of four main parts: the bullet, the case, the powder, and 
the primer. The case is the covering that holds all of the cartridge components together. 
The bullet itself is the projectile propelled from the weapon. The powder sits behind the 
bullet and is exploded during firing. The primer is the component at the rear of the case 
that starts the reaction when the cartridge is fired.6 The examiner uses a comparison 
microscope of other magnification technology to view unique striae left on the projectile. 
                                                 
4 Rinker, R.A. (2004). Understanding Firearm Ballistics (Fifth Edition). Clarksville, IN: Mulberry 
House Publishing. 
5 See National Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A 
Path Forward 150 (2009) (Strengthening Forensic Science). 
6 When a gun is fired, some of the gun's features are transferred to the shell casings, creating patterns of 
striae (scratch marks) as the cartridge casing leaves the gun. The gases produced when the primer explodes 
and gunpowder burns cause the casing to expand in all directions; as a result, markings from the breech 
face of the gun are imprinted to some degree onto the casing. In addition, in the process of igniting, the 
firing pin creates an imprint on the cartridge case. On semiautomatic firearms, a metal spring called the 
“extractor” can also leave individualized markings. There are also chamber marks on fired casings, left by 
the sides of the firing chamber as the casing slides through the gun. United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 
104, 110 (D. Mass. 2005) 
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When a bullet is fired the examiner looks for the marks created by the machined metal on 
the barrel, breach block, extractor, or firing pin on the projectile when the gun is fired.7  
 After examining the projectile the expert can make: an “identification” of the 
components, concluding that they came from the same source, an “elimination” of the 
components, concluding that they did not come from the same source, or “inconclusive,” 
meaning that there is not enough evidence to identify whether the components either do 
or do not come from the same source. In the parlance of firearm examiners, if there is 
sufficient agreement to make identification, a firearm examiner often states that the 
chance that another firearm could have made the mark is a “practical impossibility.” 
 The examiner faces the challenge of identifying both class and individual 
characteristics on the other. Class characteristics are “design features, they're what the 
manufacturer intends before the first piece of metal is processed.”8  Presumably, class 
characteristics narrow the identification to a given manufacturer, but not to an individual 
gun. Thousands of firearms may share the same class characteristics.9 Sub-class 
characteristics are markings that temporarily become part of the manufacturing process 
and therefore create a marking on perhaps hundreds of weapons in a given production 
run, though they are not a permanent feature of the design.10 In effect, sub-class 
characteristics indicate an imperfection in the method used to produce a limited number 
of firearms.11 In contrast, the individual characteristics are “imparted from the actual 
                                                 
7 BALLISTIC IMAGING 32  
8 United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 110-13 (D. Mass. 2005) 
9 (Daubert Hr'g Tr. 16-17, Nov. 2, 2005.) 
10 (Daubert Hr'g Tr. 23-24, Oct. 5, 2005.) 
11 (Daubert Hr'g Tr. 22-23, Nov. 2, 2005.) 
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piece, the actual tool” during production.12 Finally, the examiner's task is further 
complicated by the facts that accidental characteristics may be found in shell casings 
fired from the same gun and individual gun's markings change over time; marks present 
at one period may not be there at another. 
 In today’s world Forensic Ballistics experts gather shell casings and bullets 
collected at crime scenes or by test firing guns found at crime scenes to collect shell 
casings and bullets to create Ballistic Images, which are uploaded to crime databases in 
an effort to match other crimes with matching ballistics. Criminal laboratory technicians 
use the Ballistic Image databases to match evidence collected in other crimes.  In 1997 
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms was authorized to create a National 
Integrated Ballistic Information Network (NIBIN). This database only maintains records 
on ballistics recovered from crime scenes.  The States of New York and Maryland started 
a Reference Ballistic Image Database (RBID) in 2001 and 2002, which include images 
from test-fired rounds of most new and imported handguns. In concept, the state RBID 
systems would permit bullet or cartridge case evidence recovered at crime scenes to link 
a firearm’s point of sale. Currently information about a firearm is only available if the 
gun itself is recovered at the crime scene and is put through a full tracing process. The 
usefulness of this information is debatable given the Maryland State Police Forensic 
Sciences Division request that the Maryland- Integrated Ballistics Identification System 
(MD-IBIS) Program be suspended, the law be repealed and Laboratory Technicians 
associated with the program be moved to the DNA Database Unit.13 It is perhaps this last 
statement in the Forensic Sciences Division report that demonstrates a genuine question 
                                                 
12 (Daubert Hr'g Tr. 15-16, Oct. 5, 2005.) 
13 http://cdm266901.cdmhost.com/cdm/ref/collection/p266901coll7/id/3434 
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as to specific testifying experts in the area and their possible lack of specialized 
knowledge necessary to satisfy the Federal Rules of Evidence requirements. Under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702(Rule 702), the witness must be qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.14 The expert must demonstrate the 
following four factors to the courts satisfaction; scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge that will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact 
in issue; the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; the testimony is the product of 
reliable principles and methods; and the expert has reliably applied the principles and 
methods to the facts of the case.15  
 The theory underpinning forensic ballistics is that all firearms possess distinctive 
features that in turn impart distinctive markings or “toolmarks” onto projectiles and 
cartridge casings when the weapon is fired. Using a microscope, firearms examiners 
compare toolmarks found on spent projectiles and cartridge casings to determine whether 
they were fired from a particular weapon, generally by comparing projectiles and 
cartridge casings found at the scene of a crime or in an autopsy with ones test-fired from 
a seized weapon.16  
 Although Forensic Ballistics is currently allowed in the courtroom through the 
testimony of qualified government and occasionally academic experts recently judges are 
examining the underpinnings of the science and questioning the precision of 
identification in the testimony. This has resulted in rulings, which limit the once accepted 
                                                 
14 Fed. R. Evid. 702 
15 Id. 
16 Com. v. Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 837-38, 942 N.E.2d 927, 938 
(2011)Strengthening Forensic Science, supra at 150–151; Ballistic Imaging, supra at 11–
86; Theory of Identification as it Relates to Toolmarks, 30 AFTE J. 86, 86–88 (1998) 
(Theory of Identification I). 
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“a match to the exclusion of all other weapons in the world” testimony of experts. 
Forensic Ballistics experts use markings on shell casings or bullets to determine the 
match to a particular weapon. Once the evidence chain of custody is proven a court is 
concerned with matching of markings to prove the identification of a weapon associated 
with the suspect. Under this second question the court primarily questions of the expert’s 
experience in the field or certifications earned to ensure the expert meets the 
requirements of Rule 702. Currently forensic ballistics testimony is allowed if the court is 
satisfied with the evidence and the qualifications of the expert. The history of gun 
identification and current state of forensic ballistics will provide a glimpse into the world 
of forensic ballistics allowing one to better understand the complexity of the issue.  
 
II. The Use of Forensic Ballistics in the Courtroom 
 
 The current admissibility of forensic evidence was articulated by a Massachusetts 
Court’s four factors: 
 1.  When the evidence and testimony will assist a jury in reaching a verdict  
  by having the benefit of the opinion, as well as the information needed to  
  evaluate the limitations of such an opinion and the weight it deserves.17 
 
 2.  The defense counsel is furnished in discovery with the documentation  
  needed to prepare an effective cross-examination or sufficient date to  
  repeat  the expert’s identification in an attempt to rebut the   
  government’s expert witness.18   
 
 3.  The jury is provided necessary background concerning the theory and  
  methodology of forensic ballistics.19 
 
 4.  Where an opinion matching a particular firearm to recovered projectiles or 
  cartridge casings, if necessary is limited to a “reasonable degree of  
  ballistic certainty”.20 
                                                 
17 Com. v. Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 846-50, 942 N.E.2d 927, 944-47 (2011) 
18 Id.  
19 Id.  
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 While these factors represent one circuit’s current acceptance of forensic ballistic 
evidence the following cases will provide a short history on challenges to the science. 
The changing or at least limiting reliance on forensic ballistics experts in the courtroom is 
from the gatekeeping power given judges by Rule 702 and the raising chorus of scientists 
and academics questioning the scientific rigor underpinning forensic ballistics and 
journals questioning the science behind the idea that each gun has a unique fingerprint.  
 Prior to 2006 forensic ballistics had been accepted in criminal cases for decades. 
The case of United States v. Foster (Foster) in 2004 represents the mindset of courts prior 
to a pair of decisions from Massachusetts in 2006 and a 2008 national academy of 
sciences report.21 The Court ruled forensic evidence is generally admissible including a 
footnote referencing a 1935 ballistics textbook.22 The Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) expert’s testimony connected a .25 caliber and a .40 caliber cartridge with two 
separate shootings and murders. The defendants in Foster challenged the government’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
20 Id. The Courts acknowledges differing conclusions concerning the research regarding 
forensic ballistics. The Second Circuit, ballistics expert to offer opinion only that 
“firearms match was ‘more likely than not”. United States v. Glynn, 578 F.Supp.2d 567, 
574–575 (S.D.N.Y.2008); The Eleventh Circuit, forensic ballistics expert to offer opinion 
of match “to a 100% degree of certainty.” United States v. Natson 469 F.Supp.2d 1253, 
1261–1262 (M.D.Ga.2007); The First Circuit, forensic ballistics expert to testify only to 
expert's actual observations, and refusing to permit expert to offer opinion that particular 
firearm was source of recovered shell casings. United States v. Green, 405 F.Supp.2d 
104, 124 (D.Mass.2005) 
 The Court described a “reasonable degree of ballistic certainty” as a general rule 
on quality of the evidence on which the opinion rests in a particular case given it’s own 
current understanding of the scientific rigor underpinning forensic ballistics. 
21 United States v. Monteiro, 407 F. Supp. 2d 351, 374 (D. Mass. 2006) 
In United States v. Green, The case of the .308 Hi Point pistol 
22 Ballistics evidence has been accepted in criminal cases for many years. The first comprehensive 
textbook of ballistics, Firearms Investigation. Identification and Evidence, was published by Major Julian 
S. Hatcher in 1935. United States v. Foster, 300 F. Supp. 2d 375, 377 (D. Md. 2004) 
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use of forensic ballistics expert under Rule 702 in charges for multiple murders. The 
Court found the testimony admissible finding the “imprimatur of a strong general 
acceptance, not only in the expert community, but in the courts as well.” The FBI expert 
established to the court's satisfaction the general reliability of the science of ballistics, 
including comparisons of spent cartridge casings even where there is no “known” weapon 
recovered.23 In Concluding, the court notes the defendant’s access to the casings an 
option of putting on a rebuttal witness to offer a contrary opinion of the evidence. 
 In United States v. Monteiro, the government was charging defendants with RICO 
prosecution and sought to include expert testimony matching cartridge cases from scenes 
of various shooting to a 9mm gun.24 Before admitting the expert testimony the Court 
sought to qualify the government’s expert a Boston City Police Officer under 
responsibility as gatekeeper under Rule 702 ensuring he meet the “knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education” requirement. Finding that the expert lacked formal 
scientific training, certification or membership in any professional organizations, reads no 
literature in the field, and had not undertaken any proficiency testing at the time he 
performed the tests at issue in the case the court proceed to qualify the expert on the basis 
of experience. To accept an expert witness relying solely or primarily on experience, the 
court must be satisfied by the expert; explaining how the experience leads to the 
conclusion reached, why the experience form a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how 
the experience is reliably applied to the facts. Absent these requirements the trial court's 
                                                 
23 Helpful guidance is provided by the Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. Crisp, 
324 F.3d 261 (4th Cir.2003), rejecting a Daubert challenge to testimony concerning 
fingerprint and handwriting analysis. As stated in Crisp, “the touchstones for 
admissibility under Daubert are two: reliability and relevancy.” 
24 United States v. Monteiro, 407 F. Supp. 2d 351, 355-56 (D. Mass. 2006) 
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gatekeeping function becomes simply “taking the expert's word for it.”25 Here, the 
expert’s experience consisted of on the job training by an experienced examiner in 
firearms identification, attending various armorer schools, and conducting hundreds of 
examinations of firearms using a comparison microscope.26 The government forensic 
ballistic witness qualified as an expert under Rule 702 experience based his hundred 
examinations (the standard in the field) with the department and his passage of a 
nationally administered proficiency test in July 2005.27 It should be noted this 
“experience” overcame the expert’s lack of a bachelor’s degree with science courses, 
which the court quoted a American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors manual listing 
it as a “desirable” qualification for firearms examiners.28 
 Even if the expert qualified under Rule 702 the government had a burden of proof 
that in this particular case the expert’s methodology was reliable. The Court noted 
guidelines of the Association of Firearm and Tool Mark Examiners requiring examiners 
to document identifications by notes, sketches, or photographs.29 Here, the government 
expert acknowledged his failure to make sketches or take photographs and his notes 
contain no description of what process led to his conclusions and seems to acknowledge 
that current standards would require more description of his examination.30 Also, the 
                                                 
25 United States v. Monteiro, 407 F. Supp. 2d 351, 366 (D. Mass. 2006) 
26 xaminer in firearms identification and attended various armorer schools. (Daubert Hr'g Tr. 33, Oct. 28, 
2005.) He has conducted hundreds of examinations of firearms using a comparison microscope. (Id. at 
140.)To be sure, Sgt. Weddleton's scientific and academic credentials are underwhelming. 
27 (Daubert Hr'g Tr. 95, Oct. 27, 2005.) Although enough to qualify him as an expert.  
28 Furthermore, the government lists a bachelor's degree with science courses as a 
“desirable” qualification for firearm examiners, it does not list it as “essential.”, 
Laboratory  *374 Accreditation Board Manual, 29 (1997) (Ex. 49).D. Documentation21 
29 (Daubert Hr'g Tr. 43-4, Sept. 16, 2005.) 
30 notes  so the question is whether his notes provide adequate documentation of the 
identification. (Daubert Hr'g Tr. 65, 72, Oct. 28, 2005.) The three reports of 
identifications in this case, entered as Exhibits 38, 40, and 41, contain no description of 
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expert failed to have a second independent qualified examiner from his lab review the 
work or conclusions in accordance with the generally accepted standard in the field. 31 
The Court stated, “Until the basis for the identification is described in such a way that the 
procedure preformed is reproducible and verifiable, it is inadmissible under Rule 702.”32 
Besides the expert’s examination falling short of the mark in both documentation and 
peer review, in this particular case the gun was found in a state of disrepair and prior to 
test-firing the gun to match cartridge cases the government’s expert replaced a number of 
parts. In conclusion the court rules even with all the shortcomings the above forensic 
ballistic evidence will be allowed if the expert along with a second independent qualify 
examiner preform new examinations.33 It is also important to note the defendants did not 
provide rebuttal expert testimony.  
 Subsequently, In United States v. Green (Green), the government expert was to 
testifying the .308 Hi Point pistol (Hi Point) found in defendants front yard matched the 
shell castings connected to two shootings “to the exclusion of every other firearm in the 
world” as part of RICO charges.34 The expert’s examination of the evidence was not 
                                                                                                                                                 
what led Sgt. Weddleton to his conclusions. Indeed, all the reports indicate is that there 
was a “positive ID.” Even Sgt. Weddleton seems to acknowledge that current standards 
would require more description of his examination than he provided in this case. (Daubert 
Hr'g Tr. 78, Oct. 28, 2005.) 
31 (Daubert Hr'g Tr. 73, Oct. 28, 2005.). 
32 (Id. at 374.) 
33 United States v. Monteiro, 407 F. Supp. 2d 351, 374 (D. Mass. 2006) 
34 On September 9, 2000, Boston police detectives collected eight spent .380 caliber shell casings on the 
sidewalk opposite 249 Harvard Street in Boston. On September 16, 2000, following the shooting of 
Richard Green, detectives collected six spent .380 caliber shell casings at 870 Blue Hill Avenue in Boston. 
More than a year later, on September 20, 2001, detectives found a loaded Hi Point, .380 caliber pistol [“Hi 
Point pistol”] in the front yard at 6 Esmond Street in Boston. 
The government seeks to introduce ballistics testimony from Sergeant Detective James O'Shea [“O'Shea”] 
of the Boston Police Department. O'Shea examined the evidence and concluded that all of the shell casings 
came from the same weapon, and further, that the weapon was the Hi Point pistol found in front of 6 
Esmond Street. Indeed, O'Shea declared that this match could be made “to the exclusion of every other 
firearm in the world.” (Daubert Hr'g Tr. 20, 60, Oct. 5, 2005.) 
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initially recorded in any manner either by notes, measurements, photographs, or drawn 
diagrams.35 During examination the expert admitted his examination did not follow any 
known protocols for toolmark examination. He qualified as an expert under 702 based on 
“hundreds” of examinations. Unlike the previous cases the defendants in Green offered 
expert testimony possessing an advanced degree in material science but had limited 
experience in ballistics primarily from gun manufacturer armorer courses and no 
laboratory.36  Although the government expert’s examination of the evidence the primary 
issue concerned the Hi Point because it is one of the cheapest guns made making the 
softer steel more susceptible to wear over time than other firearms.37 The breech face on 
the .308 Hi Point at issue was relatively smooth making additional challenges in 
identifying class characteristics on the weapon.38 Examining the casings consisted of the 
expert comparing the evidence from two shootings and test firing the Hi Point found by 
law enforcement in the front yard of defendants. The expert also examined test-fired 
casings to four other Hi Points in the possession of the department but he did not compare 
casings of other inexpensive guns.39  Ultimately the court allowed the testimony but 
prevented the government expert from stating the match was “to the exclusion of every 
other firearm in the world.”  
 In United States v. Glynn (Glynn), the court found that ballistics testimony was 
accepted without question for many decades in United States federal courts but new 
scrutiny in light of the judicial gatekeeping of reliable evidence and a recent scientific 
                                                 
35 United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 108 (D. Mass. 2005) 
36 United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 108 (D. Mass. 2005) 
37 United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 111-13 (D. Mass. 2005) (Daubert Hr'g Tr. 75, Oct. 5, 
2005.) 
38 (Daubert Hr'g Tr. 75, Oct. 5, 2005.) (Daubert Hr'g Tr. 23-25, Nov. 2, 2005.) 
39 United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 111-13 (D. Mass. 2005) (Daubert Hr'g Tr. 66, Nov. 2, 
2005), United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 115 (D. Mass. 2005) 
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journal.40 The defendant in Glynn faced a new trial after murder charges had deadlocked 
the jury resulting in a mistrial. As part of the case the government expert testified the 
murder weapon matched casings from two prior shootings. The discussion allowed the 
testimony but the judge had serious questions about the scientific assumptions related to 
forensic ballistic evidence.41 After questioning the science the court ruled the expert 
could only state a firearms match was “more likely than not” and was not allowed to say 
ballistics was a science or his conclusions were reached with any degree of certainty.42   
 The use of defendant’s rebuttal expert witness was restricted in United States v. 
Taylor (Taylor) because the court believes an expert critic tended to confuse rather than 
assist the jury. The government sought to offer forensic ballistic expert testimony from a 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives examiner (ATF expert) as part of 
conspiracy charges against multiple defendants.43 Defendants proffered their own expert 
and academic who has researched and written on the subject of firearms identification.44 
The ATF expert provided the government’s critic of the Defendant’s expert published 
writings stating they were based primarily on secondary sources, took some studies out of 
context almost to the point of misleading, and lack of any experience examining firearms 
(testifying she had never even fired a gun).45 The court reviewed the Third and Eleventh 
Circuit’s prior rulings concerning a notorious Professor’s testimony as “there is no such 
thing as a handwriting expert” expert. The Third Circuit allowed this Professor to testify 
as to reliability of experts in the field although was not qualified according to the court to 
                                                 
40 United States v. Glynn, 578 F. Supp. 2d 567, 569-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
41 is found in section five. 
42 United States v. Glynn, 578 F. Supp. 2d 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
43 United States v. Taylor, 704 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1194 (D.N.M. 2009) 
44 United States v. Taylor, 704 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1193 (D.N.M. 2009) 
45 United States v. Taylor, 704 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1199-200 (D.N.M. 2009) 
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be an expert in the field on handwriting himself.46 Alternatively, the Eleventh Circuit’s 
excluded the Professors testimony focusing on the complete lack of experience in 
handwriting analysis. The court found he did not possess an acceptable degree of 
knowledge, provided no assistance to the jury, and was not a qualified expert in the 
field.47 After reviewing the aforementioned cases the Taylor court held the defendant’s 
expert testimony would confuse instead of assisting the jury and most significantly the 
expert was not sufficiently reliable to gain admissibility under Rule 702 or Daubert.48 
Taylor’s decision highlights the concern with the court’s focus on “whether this particular 
evidence matches this specific gun” risks missing the point; whether or not the “art” of 
forensic ballistics is reliable.  
 While the courts in Green and Monteiro grappled with the science behind ballistic 
evidence the Second Circuit in Taylor focused on the match of the specific evidence to 
glossing over the issue raised by the defendants and their expert, “As a whole is the 
art/science of microscopic pattern matching based on false assumptions. Other courts 
have determined the testimony of experts is unreliable and therefore limit the statistical 
certainty an expert can claim for the origin of the ballistic marks.  
 In United States v. St Gerrard, testimony by the government expert included a 
statement that it would be practically impossible for the markings on the casings to have 
come from anything except defendants AK-47.49 The case involved a shooting on a 
military base in Germany where defendant was alleged to have shot at another soldier. 
Although the court found the government’s expert qualified to give expert testimony 
                                                 
46 United States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844, 851 (3d Cir.1995) 
47 United States v. Paul, 175 F.3d 906 (11th Cir.1999) 
48 United States v. Taylor, 704 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1199 (D.N.M. 2009) 
49 United States v. St. Gerrard, US Army Trial Judiciary, 5th Judicial Cir., Germany (7 June 2010) 
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under Rule 702, it determined the possible error rates involved in the examination of 
toolmarks, the recent National Academy Science Report and held the expert’s testimony 
to be unreliable. However the expert was still able to testify but was prevented from 
claiming the statistical certainty of “practically impossible” under Daubert.50 In 
discussing the NAS Report the court concluded ballistic identification to be a subjective 
process lacking quantitative standards, grounded in a limited testing, and not 
demonstrating scientific principles establishing toolmark origins to any specific certainty. 
The unreliability of the testimony would have unfairly prejudiced the defendant.  
 While courts retain discretion under Rule 702 and Daubert, the next case outlines 
how structured the admissibility of forensic evidence today is which could in fact protect 
the status quo by limiting the use of rebuttal evidence to criticize the science behind 
pattern matching. 
 The court in Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang (Pytou) articulated four factors in 
order to determine the admissibility of forensic ballistic expert testimony. First, the 
evidence and testimony must assist a jury in reaching a verdict by having the benefit of 
the opinion, as well as the information needed to evaluate the limitations of such an 
opinion and the weight it deserves.51 Second, in discovery defense counsel must be 
furnished with documentation necessary to prepare an effective cross-examination or 
sufficient data to repeat the expert’s identification in an attempt to rebut the government’s 
expert witness.52 Third, provide the jury necessary background concerning the theory and 
                                                 
50 reliability and relevancy.”United States v. Foster, 300 F. Supp. 2d 375, 376 (D. Md. 2004) 
51 Com. v. Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 846-50, 942 N.E.2d 927, 944-47 (2011) 
52 Id.  
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methodology of forensic ballistics.53 Fourth, if necessary limit the opinion matching a 
articular firearm to recovered projectiles or  cartridge casings to a “reasonable degree of 
ballistic certainty”.54 Examining the use of government and rebuttal experts through these 
four factors will highlight the advances made and the difficulty in further challenges.  
 In Pytou, the defendant was convicted of two murders in a jury trial.55 The 
government expert presented forensic ballistic evidence connecting 3 bullets and 
cartridge casings to a nine-millimeter gun in the possession of the defendant however 
expert stated, the match could not exclude every other nine millimeter weapon with 
similar barrel characteristics.56 
 First, the court believed the nature of the testimony in Pytou would assist the jury 
reaching a verdict by providing information necessary to evaluate and weigh the evidence 
properly. 57  This first step ensures the testimony will not confuse the jury. Here, the 
expert limited his own testimony concerning the match of the evidence so as not to lead 
the jury to give improper weight to the evidence. It remains to be seen if a rebuttal expert 
under this factor would be admissible, In Glynn the defendant expert was allowed to 
                                                 
53 Id.  
54 Id. The Courts acknowledges differing conclusions concerning the research regarding 
forensic ballistics. The Second Circuit, ballistics expert to offer opinion only that 
“firearms match was ‘more likely than not”. United States v. Glynn, 578 F.Supp.2d 567, 
574–575 (S.D.N.Y.2008); The Eleventh Circuit, forensic ballistics expert to offer opinion 
of match “to a 100% degree of certainty.” United States v. Natson 469 F.Supp.2d 1253, 
1261–1262 (M.D.Ga.2007); The First Circuit, forensic ballistics expert to testify only to 
expert's actual observations, and refusing to permit expert to offer opinion that particular 
firearm was source of recovered shell casings. United States v. Green, 405 F.Supp.2d 
104, 124 (D.Mass.2005) 
 The Court described a “reasonable degree of ballistic certainty” as a general rule 
on quality of the evidence on which the opinion rests in a particular case given it’s own 
current understanding of the scientific rigor underpinning forensic ballistics. 
55 Com. v. Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 828-29, 942 N.E.2d 927, 932 (2011) 
56 Com. v. Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 835, 942 N.E.2d 927, 936 (2011) 
57 Com. v. Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 846-50, 942 N.E.2d 927, 944-47 (2011) 
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testify while in Taylor rebuttal expert testimony was not allowed at trial and confusion of 
the jury was stated as one reason. 
 Second, in discovery defense counsel must be furnished with documentation 
necessary to prepare an effective cross-examination or sufficient data to repeat the 
expert’s identification in an attempt to rebut the government’s expert witness.58 The basis 
for this step is in both ensuring the defense is able to see the evidence convicting them 
but also requires the government expert to follow standards in the field.59 In this case the 
government provided adequate documentation concerning the expert’s examination of the 
forensic ballistic evidence. Although important the documentation in this factor case only 
be used by the defense in hopes a independent qualified examiner can contradict the 
government expert’s match. Whether forensic science is scientifically reliable is not part 
of this factor.  
 Third, the forensic ballistics expert should explain to the jury necessary 
background concerning the theory and methodology in forensic ballistics.60 Lurking 
underneath the surface of this step is the courts desire for the jury to understand what the 
expert is testifying about. Unfortunately a prolonged discussion about class, subclass and 
individual characteristics risk elevating the expert.61 Here, the expert informed the jury 
about identifying toolmark characteristics and explained the scientific limits of firearms 
matching. However during testimony the government’s expert stated it was a practical 
                                                 
58 Id.  
59 Com. v. Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 846-50, 942 N.E.2d 927, 944-47 (2011) United 
States vs. Monteiro, U.S. Dist. Ct. Criminal No. 03–10329–PBS (D.Mass. Nov. 28, 2005) 
(AFTE guidelines require examiners to document identifications by notes, sketches, or 
photographs, and barring expert forensic ballistics testimony until adequate 
documentation is provided). 
60 Id.  
61 Com. v. Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 846-50, 942 N.E.2d 927, 944-47 (2011) 
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impossibility that another weapon fired the projectiles.62 The next factor addresses 
potential overstatements by experts. 
 Fourth and finally, the opinion of the expert if necessary should be limited. The 
examination of forensic ballistics sometimes results in a less than 100% match and in 
these cases the court must limit the expert’s testimony.63 An expert that states their 
opinion to a “reasonable degree of ballistic certainty” is stating a scientific degree of 
precision or statistical certainty where none is present.64 The phrase “reasonable degree 
of scientific certainty” should also be avoided because it suggests that forensic ballistics 
is a science, where it is clearly as much an art as a science.65 As discussed above, the 
expert’s testimony here was limited from saying the match could exclude every other 9 
millimeter firearm with six lands and six grooves and a right-hand twist. However on 
redirect examination the expert stated it was practically impossible for the projectiles here 
to be from another firearm.66 The potential for a expert to circumvent a courts limits 
raises concerns as to whether the weight of a forensic ballistics expert can in fact be 
limited in a manner which allows the jury to distinguish differences in scientific certainty.  
 In conclusion,  the problem of forensic ballistic evidence is that although there is 
no question that there are many marks on shell casings, from all of these sources-
production process, firing pin, breech face, etc. But even assuming that some of these 
marks are unique to the gun in question, the issue is their significance, how the examiner 
                                                 
62 Com. v. Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 846, 942 N.E.2d 927, 944 (2011) 
63 Com. v. Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 846-50, 942 N.E.2d 927, 944-47 (2011) 
64 Com. v. Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 846-50, 942 N.E.2d 927, 944-47 (2011) Ballistic 
Imaging, supra at 82 
65 Com. v. Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 846-50, 942 N.E.2d 927, 944-47 (2011) See 
Ballistic Imaging, supra at 54–56. 
66 Com. v. Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 846, 942 N.E.2d 927, 944 (2011) 
 18 
can distinguish one from another, which to discount and which to focus on, how qualified 
he is to do so, and how reliable his examination is.67 
  
III. History of Forensic Ballistics 
 
 Forensic ballistic evidence has been used in criminal cases since the early 1920’s 
however the use of this evidence is only now beginning to be challenged. After reviewing 
the history of this evidence one question remains unanswered, was forensic science 
created because the science underpinning its use was solid or if it was simply necessary 
to combat the evils in civilized society.   
 Examining the history of the science of firearms identification highlights the 
absence of scientific basis in the assumption that all firearms leave uniquely identifiable 
marks. In order to view two projectiles at one time Cornel Calvin Goddard and Philip O. 
Gravelle invented the comparison microscope. Prior to the creation of the comparison 
microscope firearms experts had to remember identifying marks on each specimen. Of 
course the ability to view two bullets or cartridge casings allowed more actuate 
examination of the unique striae left on the bullet or cartridge case from the worn, 
machined metal of the barrel, breach block, extractor, or firing pin. Identification of 
projectiles and casings as a field in forensics is a direct result of the comparison 
microscope. Over the last eighty years the basic tools and techniques have remained 
unchanged which are to determine whether or not ammunition components were fired by 
                                                 
67 United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 110-13 (D. Mass. 2005) 
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a single firearm based on unique and reproducible microscopic and class characteristics, 
or to reach a "no conclusion" result if insufficient marks are present.68 
 On February 14th 1929, seven men were lined up and shoot with ninety rounds of 
ammunition inside a Chicago garage. This “massacre” during the day involving the 
killing of five North Sides shocked America.69 Adding to the hysteria was the fact that 
witnesses had seen police officers in the area during the time of the shooting leading to 
the speculation of Chicago involvement in the murders.70 At the request of a Chicago 
coroner Goddard traveled to Chicago to assist in the invention.71 Using a comparison 
microscope adapted for ballistics comparison Goddard absolved the Chicago Police 
Department’s participation in the St. Valentine's Day Massacre. Although this case is one 
of the most notorious in America’s gangland history it shows the increasing need for 
firearms to be identified and have wrongdoers convicted for their crimes.  
 
IV. Certification of Forensic Ballistics Examiners 
 
 While it is possible for a expert to be qualified absent passing a nationwide 
certification test the court has been given discretion as a gatekeeper under Rule 702. 
                                                 
68 John H. Dillon, Jr , Comparison Microscopy: The Origins of Firearms identification, A Practical 
Application of Forensic Science, Technology and Engineering to Case Linkage in Shooting Incidents Not 
Previously Related by Investigative personnel, BulletTRAX-3D, MatchPoint Plus and the Firearms 
Examiner, 2005. 
69 Rasmussen, Frederick N. "Baltimore native helped solve 1929 St. Valentine's Day 
Massacre," The Baltimore Sun, Sunday, February 13, 2011. 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-02-12/news/bs-md-backstory-st.-valentines-day-
20110213_1_goddard-comparison-microscope-firearms 








Courts must review the admissibility of an expert in light of the “knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education” they possess. It is important to know that certification 
of forensic ballistics examiners does not change whether or not the scientific assumptions 
on which it is based are sound. Certification of forensic ballistics examiners into is one 
way courts can attempt to determine the reliability of the proposed testimony.  
 Courts are reluctant to exclude forensic ballistic evidence because of the 
precedent that has been set in courts across the country for decades. More recently the 
court in Monteiro found the expert lacked formal scientific training, certification or 
membership in any professional organizations, reads no literature in the field, and had not 
undertaken any proficiency testing but the expert was still qualified on his “hundreds” of 
prior examinations and his passage of a nationally administered proficiency test in July 
2005.72 This expert seeking out and passing a proficiency test prior to trial demonstrates 
the fact that courts look for credentials with experts and a proficiency test is a credential.  
 The Association of Firearm and Tool Mark Examiners (AFTE), is the principal 
professional organization for firearms and toolmark examiners. The peer-reviewed 
journal published AFTE allows for the testing of scientific principles concerning forensic 
evidence from toolmarks, validating current technique of firearm identification.73   
 The AFTE is one of many forensic ballistic evidence organizations offering a 
proficiency certification, which consists of a packet of ballistic ammunition containing a 
number of bullets and cartridges. The individual examiner reviews the specimens 
determining either identification, inconclusive, or elimination of the projectile as a match. 
While examining each specimen the tester is asked to document his or her findings. 
                                                 
72 (Daubert Hr'g Tr. 95, Oct. 27, 2005.) Although enough to qualify him as an expert.  
73 technique of firearm identification United States v. Monteiro, 407 F. Supp. 2d 351, 366 (D. Mass. 2006) 
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 Ultimately the design of a proficiency test can only test an individuals ability to 
used verified firearms identification techniques and the ability one possess to use those 
techniques to match microscopic patterns unique to each weapon. The question remaining 
is the subjective nature inherent in forensic ballistic evidence identification.74  
Toolmark evidence and DNA evidence are markedly different in the 
crucial respect of subjectivity inherent in the analysis. Firearms 
identification ultimately comes down to a subjective assessment 
specifically, a subjective probability statement (although practitioners 
often render these as absolute statements). Firearms examiners observe 
concrete, objective phenomena. The difficulty is in developing a structural 
basis for evidence evaluation.75 
 
 The Monteiro court stated the AFTE Theory of identification’s critical problem 
no objective standard when deciding a particular mark is a subclass or individual 
characteristic.76 The AFTE states caution should be made in distinguishing between the 
two characteristics.77 The court seems to consider the focus placed by AFTE on the 
examiners training and experience in order to distinguish characteristics creates a serious 
problem concerning whether the testimony is reliable. The court concludes it has the 
discretion to allow subjective opinions if they are based on adequate experience and 
training.78  
 Overcoming the current status of admissibility remains difficult based forensic 
examiner professional organizations, proficiency tests for certification and the status of 
                                                 
74 Page 57 in Ballistic Imaging 
75 Page 50 in Ballistic Imaging 
76 United States v. Monteiro, 407 F. Supp. 2d 351, 371 (D. Mass. 2006) 
77 United States v. Monteiro, 407 F. Supp. 2d 351, 371 (D. Mass. 2006) 
78 United States v. Monteiro, 407 F. Supp. 2d 351, 374 (D. Mass. 2006) 
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law enforcement providing the testimony. When combined these factors establish 
“general acceptance in the field” standard which courts are reluctant to rule against.79  
 
V. Lingering Issues about Forensic Ballistics and Conclusion 
 
 The scientific community has recently issued two articles where the scientific 
basis for identification using forensic ballistic evidence. The continued use of this 
evidence in light of the reports raises the question of whether forensic ballistics is used 
because of reliability or simply out of need.  
 The NAS 2008 report cautioned: Conclusions drawn in firearms identification 
should not be made to imply the presence of a firm statistical basis when none has been 
demonstrated. Specifically, examiners tend to cast their assessments in bold absolutes, 
commonly asserting that a match can be made “to the exclusion of all other firearms in 
the world.” Such comments cloak the inherently subjective assessment of matches with 
an extreme probability statement that has no firm grounding and unrealistically implies 
an error rate of zero. 80 Following the report, In United States v. Glynn, the court ruled 
that the expert could not use the term “reasonable scientific certainty” in testifying.81 
Rather, the expert would be permitted to testify only that it was “more likely than not” 
that recovered bullets and cartridge cases came from a particular weapon, stating “based 
on the Daubert hearings whatever else ballistics identification analysis could be called, it 
could not fairly be called ‘science.’”82 The court added that the “problem is compounded 
by the tendency of ballistics experts . . . to make assertions that their matches are certain 
                                                 
79 Page 68 in Ballistic Imaging 
80 . Id. at 82. 
81 United States v. Glynn, 578 F. Supp. 2d 567  (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
82 Id. at 570. 
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beyond all doubt, that the error rate of their methodology is ‘zero,’ and other such 
pretensions.”83  
 The 2009 NAS Report found that not enough is known about the variability’s 
among individual tools and guns, we are not able to specify how many points of 
similarity are necessary for a given level of confidence in the result. Sufficient studies 
have not been done to understand the reliability and repeatability of the methods. The 
committee agrees that class characteristics are helpful in narrowing the pool of tools that 
may have left a distinctive mark. Individual patterns from manufacture or from wear 
might, in some cases.84 In a different passage, the report remarked “much forensic 
evidence ‘including firearm and toolmarks identifications’ is introduced in criminal trials 
without any meaningful scientific validation, determination of error rates, or reliability 
testing to explain the limits of the discipline.”85 
 In 2011, the Massecussetts court explained the current acceptance of forensic 
evidence by stating: 
 
“while the uniqueness of toolmarks has yet to be scientifically determined 
and while the process by which a firearms examiner declares a “match” 
remains inherently subjective, however that experience has demonstrated 
that firearms examiners can and consistently do compare such markings 
and reach opinions that can assist finders  of fact.”86  
 
                                                 
83 Id. at 574. 
84 (National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, Strengthening Forensic 
Science in the United States: A Path Forward 154 (2009) 
85  (Id. at 107-08.) 
86 Com. v. Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 846-50, 942 N.E.2d 927, 944-47 (2011) 
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 The argument that forensic ballistic experts are admissibly because they have 
been in the past rings hollow and focuses on the matching of the evidence in a particular 
case instead of the scientific foundation of the opinion.87  
 Ultimately the basis which allows forensic ballistic evidence in the courtroom will 
not be changed until the forces holding it in place realize that long accepted “scientific” 
evidence has a presumed admissibility difficult for the average defendant to overcome.  
In addition, the systems of peer-reviewed toolmark certification authorities, law 
enforcement agency resources, and the social need to sole crimes or convict the 
responsible individual pose separate hurtles for a zealous defendant wishing to oppose the 
use of forensic ballistic in his murder charge.  
 The current forensic ballistic expert engages in complex microscopic pattern-
matching on the assumption that all guns leave a individualized set of marks that can be 
scientifically recorded and repeated. So long as the drawings, photos, and notes are 
adequate for a second examiner to review the findings will be sufficient and courts will 
allow the Government’s expert to testify. This becomes little more than a courtroom 
routine ensuring proper form of ballistic evidence resulting in the acceptance of highly 
persuasive testimony.  
 Today thousands of guns are made by hundreds of manufactures often designed 
with brand identifiers and made on assembly lines maintain a standard quality for each 
weapon create at least the possibility that all guns at all times do not leave individually 
identifiable markings on shell casings and bullets.  
                                                 
87 United States v. Glynn, 578 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
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 The emphasis courts give to the experience of law enforcement experts who spend 
sometimes years in the field of ballistic examination even if entirely understandable 
creates a barrier for a defendant looking to rebut the evidence.  
 In the area of forensic ballistics a large study examining the science in the 
assumption every tool leaves a unique individualized mark identifiable by a experienced 
and trained expert needs to be undertaken. The reluctance courts have shown reluctance 
academic experts testifying in the field of forensic ballistics create a disadvantage to 
defendants hoping to rebut a government expert.88 The remaining option for defendants is 
to find a group of committed individuals possessing the training, experience, 
certifications, and equipment who can offer contradictory testimony. This defense team 
fantasy could hope to qualify its own anti-criminal laboratory technicians use the Ballistic 
Image databases to match evidence collected in other crimes. Access to NIBIN or another 
large database of ballistic information could provide a way of demonstrating the 
existence of other matches “in the world.”89 However this is unrealistic given the control 
proponents of the current state of forensic ballistics have on training, experience, and 
certification of forensic laboratories and experts.   
                                                 
88 United States v. Taylor, 704 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1194-96 (D.N.M. 2009) 
89 http://www.atf.gov/publications/factsheets/factsheet-nibin.html  
